Was Anthropogenic Climate Change Falsifiable in 1925?: Reflection on the Scientific Attitude by Bouleau, Nicolas
Was Anthropogenic Climate Change Falsifiable in 1925?
Nicolas Bouleau
To cite this version:
Nicolas Bouleau. Was Anthropogenic Climate Change Falsifiable in 1925?: Reflection on the
Scientific Attitude. 2007. <halshs-00125457v2>
HAL Id: halshs-00125457
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00125457v2
Submitted on 23 Mar 2007
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 Was Anthropogenic Climate Change Falsifiable in 1925? 
Reflection on the Scientific Attitude 
Nicolas BOULEAU 
CIRED March 2007 
 
In 1925, a French astronomer J. Mascart achieved the gigantic work of studying more than three thousand 
publications in order to sum up the available knowledge about the climate variability. He published his analysis and 
conclusions in a book. We base on this work to tackle anew some epistemological problems. In particular we weigh up 
the relevance of the popperian doctrine in the case of climate change. As eventually seen, the strict framework of 
falsifiability does not practically operate and the most rational position seemed to stake on improving measurements and 
scientific networking. We qualify this position as “narrowly scientific”. The case of climate change is, in fact, 
representative of any question of knowledge whose assessments and controls are postponed to the future, which is the 
case of every theory attempting to say more than available measurements. 
This leads us to reconsider the narrowly scientific position, a wait and see policy which does not take into 
account the interests involved in contradictory representations. We discuss a more engaged attitude for research centres 
that is better placed to anticipate possible dangerous uses. 
 
 
Le changement climatique anthropique était-il réfutable en 1925 ? 
Réflexion sur l'attitude scientifique. 
 
 Nous étudions la pertinence de la doctrine popperienne dans le cas du changement climatique telle que cette 
connaissance était appréhendée en 1925 en nous fondant sur une analyse approfondie et quasi-exhaustive de J. Mascart 
des travaux et théories disponibles à cette époque. On s’aperçoit que le cadre strict de la réfutabilité n’est pas opérant et 
qu'à cette époque la position qui se voulait la plus rationnelle, apparentée à des points de vue qui seront, après guerre, 
ceux de Lakatos, Quine et Feyerabend, est finalement attentiste. Nous la qualifions de scientifique au sens étroit. Le cas 
du changement climatique est, en fait, générique de toute question de connaissance dont les sanctions et contrôles sont 
repoussés à plus tard, ce qui est le cas de toute théorie qui prétend dire plus que les mesures disponibles. 
 Ceci nous conduit à reconsidérer la position scientifique étroite qui ne tient pas compte des intérêts en jeu dans 
les représentations contradictoires. Nous discutons de la part des laboratoires une attitude plus engagée et plus 
anticipative d’usages possibles éventuellement dangereux. 
 
I. Introduction. The Popperian doctrine and its critics. 
 
The philosophy of Karl Popper is famous principally for the idea that certain 
intellectual constructions are easier than true science because they avoid verification by 
experiment. Among them are theories which present themselves as scientific, such as 
the dialectical materialism of Marx and Lenin, or which claim scientific status in a 
special sense like the sociological method explained by Max Weber; and collections of 
interpreted observations such as psychoanalysis, which are scientific according to some 
(Freud), or structurable knowledge according to others (Lacan).  
In support of the theses of John Stuart Mill on the value of the open criticism of 
ideas, Karl Popper developed “a corpus of doctrine” able to define what is scientific 
and what is not, as well as the direction a more rigorous science should take: the real 
content of a theory is the sum of the statements which refute it, its potential falsifiers. A 
theory becomes more vulnerable as its content increases. When a theory is rejected by 
experiment, a new theory has to be found which fits in with what remains valid in the 
former while proposing an alternative for where the difficulty occurred. It is not sure 
that such a better theory can be found each time a problem occurs: this depends on the 
inventiveness of the researchers.  
Since what scientists are going to discover is, by nature, unpredictable, the future 
of society is open and theories which claim to grasp the direction of History are non 
scientific. Popper’s criticism of historicism should be considered as a polemical 
extension of his doctrine, with its sights firmly set on Marxism-Leninism, but it cannot 
easily be included in his epistemological thesis proper, since Popper does not deny the 
predictive value of scientific theories: on the contrary, Galle’s discovery of Neptune 
using the calculations of Le Verrier is exemplary of the scientific approach. To avoid 
the contradiction, Popper is obliged to introduce his three-world theory, which is not 
easily acceptable, especially in the field of biology.  
The failings of the Popperian doctrine have been set out by many authors, but 
they remain less well-known to the general public. School manuals only teach the idea 
of “falsifiability”. The two most damaging critiques are those of Adolf Grünbaum, who 
pretends to believe in the doctrine in order to analyze the properties of the rationalism 
to which it leads1, and of Paul Feyerabend, who does not believe in the doctrine at all, 
and whose main point is that things did not happen that way historically, not even in 
the case of Newtonian mechanics and relativity. To each of the questions: 1. Can we 
wish to live according to the rules of critical rationalism [the name given to the 
Popperian doctrine]? 2. Is it possible to keep both Science as we know it and these 
rules? Feyerabend answers no, basing his argument, and thus giving weight to it, on an 
analysis of real situations and the real human behaviour of scientists2, an analysis 
which continues through his whole work. Grünbaum and Feyerabend examine in detail 
the question of the replacement of one theory by another, and show that the matter is 
far from being as simple as Popper suggests.  
The transition from Newtonian mechanics to relativist mechanics is a difficult 
case to hold up as the archetype of the truly scientific. The costume is too tight. One of 
the assets of Feyerabend’s argument that “everything goes” is that it can receive in the 
field of knowledge all the issues in which we are involved today, and not only those of 
physics. The very notion of theory, with its logical and mathematical framework, such 
as the epistemologists used it during the three first quarters of the 20th century, is too 
restrictive.  For instance, what is called chaos theory today is not a theory in this sense, 
but a phenomenological collection of properties of certain systems.  
Two circumstances lead us to take a certain distance from Popper and from his 
better known critics alike. One, very sudden, was the development of modelling that 
accompanied the computer science boom during the last third of the 20th century, a 
new form of knowledge whose characteristics have to be studied. The other, more 
gradual, is the growing presence of environmental issues (waste, biodiversity, climate) 
and ethical issues (cloning, perinatal innovation, human genetics). Do Popper, Lakatos, 
and Feyerabend set themselves the right problem? When Feyerabend writes that 
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 A. Grünbaum, “Is the method of bold conjectures and attempted refutations justifiably the method of 
science?”  Brit. Jour. Philosophical Sci. 27 (1976) 105-326. 
2
 P. Feyerabend, Against Method, New Left Books, 1975, Chapter 15 in particular. 
theoretical anarchy is more apt to develop progress than doctrines based on law and 
order or again that the only principle which does not restrict progress is “everything 
goes”, we have a right to wonder whether these positions are not showing their age, 
and whether the real problem today is not rather to know if technical innovation can be 
fostered with more respect for the values of civilization, in its most common sense as 
the opposite of barbarism, and with greater lucidity about the risks being generated3. 
In the following pages of this article, we carry through this reflection, basing 
ourselves on an analysis of the case of climate variability and its causes at the 
beginning of the 20th century. At that time, a synthesis of available scientific works 
was still possible, so that what was already a very complex issue has lessons for us 
when transposed to today. 
 
II. How was the science of climate change to be taken forward in 1925? 
 
The issue of climate change is peculiarly appropriate for putting Popper’s ideas 
to the test. Central among contemporary debates in which science is expected to be an 
arbitrator, climate change is the province neither of metaphysics nor of psychological 
or social interpretation, but of the natural sciences, whose outlines it is bound to 
question. It is located in the very place where the purification of facts requires the 
conditions of observation to be made specific to the most anecdotal of detail and 
frustrates true understanding.  
In this perspective, there are two principal advantages to basing our study on the 
work of Jean Mascart entitled Notes sur la variabilité des climats, 383p, Lyon, M. 
Audin 1925. Firstly, the author makes no attempt to defend one particular explanatory 
theory but rather strives with true scientific rigour to evaluate the various chains of 
argument as well as the quality of the measures. Secondly, his study presents a 
synthesis of the works available at that time that if not exhaustive is nonetheless 
outstandingly complete: he analyses almost 3100 bibliographical references involving 
more than 1000 authors. 
The landscape, as we are going to see, is complex. We meet the most varied 
points of view, more or less well supported, which often defy comparison due to the 
multiplicity of explanatory fields they appeal to, and the specificity of the data they 
interpret. This great mass of documents and opinion creates a situation close to that we 
confront on most subjects today on a permanent basis with the Internet: information 
overload. 
Jean Mascart shows a great concern for exactness. He was an astronomer, son of 
the physicist Eleuthère Mascart whose experiments prior to Michelson’s against the 
existence of ether made him a pioneer in relativity theory4. But Jean Mascart is far 
from being interested only in astronomical factors. On the contrary, he attaches great 
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 Actually, Feyerabend approaches the legitimacy of non-dominant knowledge and the democratization of its 
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 Cf. M.-A. Tonnelat Histoire du principe de relativité, Flammarion 1971 and R. Mossery Léon Brillouin, 
Belin 1999, Pages 11-30. 
value to all accounts and historical and economic testimonies, and in his conclusion, 
which betrays a certain epistemological unease, he stresses the importance of archival 
research and of the systematic collection of reliable data.  
To situate his work, he first sets himself apart from the great narrative frescos 
such as that of Bertrand on the Révolutions du globe in which hypotheses on the 
formation of the earth’s crust jostle together with Buffon’s theory, Fourier’s theory of 
heat, and Lyell’s theory on the mass of waters, and so on.  He criticizes the art of 
evocation without serious foundation, and he himself determines to draw on the 
experimental sciences: astronomy, geology, the physics of the globe, geography, 
oceanography, and meteorology. “It is necessary to retain in these matters”, he writes, 
“a degree of scepticism, since it has been impossible until today to give an accurate 
definition of the very word climate that we use.” For sure, the term climate sums up the 
invariability of the weather in a region once the daily and yearly variations have been 
abstracted, but the notion is vast in view of the physical parameters involved, and yet 
sins by omission in having no precise and clear marker as far as the long term is 
concerned. In other words, the signal is unknown as far as low frequencies are 
concerned. Mascart gradually adopts a position that we could qualify as positivist on 
this point, considering that it is rather useless to keep on trying to define this primitive 
word.  
As recommended by Claude Bernard, Mascart looks for the efficient cause of the 
phenomena of glaciation by sifting the evidence of the plant fossil record. Ever the 
good astronomer, he finds it in the eccentricity of the earth’s orbit, the precession of the 
equinoxes (variation of the earth’s axis), and the variations of the activity of the sun. 
These causes being in any case indisputable and calculable, he deems it evident that the 
earth is not in a steady and constant state as far as its astronomical evolution is 
concerned, and that consequently climatic variations are currently taking place. His 
aim thus defines itself as “to search for the symptoms of climate change in the most 
recent human period”. Naturally, he knows that “economic and political phenomena 
may intervene” - unbalanced irrigation, deforestation, and so on - and he cites 
Bourquin on that point: “the sunshine and desolation of lands where once bloomed 
great empires such as Tello, Babylon, Nineveh, Persepolis and Thebes were due, above 
all, to the lack of foresight or mistakes of men, and to political and economic events, 
rather than to natural phenomena.” 
After the astronomical causes, he approaches the physical causes and in 
particular the greenhouse effect. He credits the Belgian scholar W. Spring5 with being 
the first to insist on the role played by carbon dioxide in the thermal balance of the 
atmosphere, ahead of Arrhenius (1895). Mascart expresses many reservations about 
Arrhenius’ theory, which suggests that the carbon dioxide content variation hypothesis 
may explain variations at the geological scale, without astronomical cycles. He 
observes that if this were the case, the causes of the variations would remain obscure, 
and disputes the role of volcanoes and solubility in the ocean. He also disputes the 
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 W. Spring "Recherches sur les proportions d’acide carbonique contenues dans l’air"  Mém. de l’Acad. de 
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orders of magnitude of the temperature changes connected with increases or decreases 
in carbon gas calculated by Arrhenius, which he finds excessive in both directions. But 
his principal disagreement is with Arrhenius’ view that the recent and future increase 
of carbon dioxide content will be beneficial, by making winters milder and summers 
cooler, thanks to rain.  
Mascart thinks that the proportion of carbon dioxide should be considered to be 
stable during historical time, with the exception of the recent period during which “the 
artificial combustion of coal has destroyed the balance, all the more as coal 
consumption has tremendously increased.” Arrhenius’ idea that the inescapable cooling 
of the Earth due to physical and astronomical causes is fortunately balanced by an 
increase in carbon dioxide of human origin (an increase which started in the 19th 
century and which makes winter softer, summer more rainy, and plants grow better) is, 
to Mascart, a mistake, since the two phenomena are from different time scales. “This 
cooling [of our globe] is so very slow that for it to be demonstrated, very precise 
observations would have to be made, and continued over at least several centuries – 
perhaps even ten or twenty centuries.” (p.113)   
“Geographical causes” are to be understood as the analysis of air stream 
influence (influences on water and temperature transport, influences upon precipitation, 
erosion and modification of relief), the analysis of ocean currents (influences such as 
that of the Gulf Stream, or the melting of polar ice providing cold fresh water), and the 
influence of local circumstances (lakes softening the climate, volcanoes). It is clearly 
apparent in the works of certain authors studied that the causes do not take the logical 
form of a tree diagram, but that some are linked by feedback. For instance, the position 
of the Earth’s axis has an obvious influence on the variation of the main air streams, 
which in turn may influence the axis of rotation by an inertia effect. We begin to see 
that the complexity of the phenomena makes it impossible to organise them 
hierarchically as the different terms of a convergent series. Confronted by the profusion 
of diverse theories, Mascart continues to defend the plurality of ideas. “The most 
important question is: what is a hypothesis?” he writes, and adds “A hypothesis is 
nothing but a momentary construction: it has no absolute or final value […] A 
hypothesis is good if it is fertile, if it stirs up research and criticism.” Mascart would 
thus be closer to Lakatos’ ideas than to Popper’s. To him, the test of a hypothesis is not 
refutation by experiment. His position is more subtle: he has confidence in opinion that 
will prevail with time, and gives bonus points to what is likely to encourage future 
research. So, on a controversy which impassioned people at the time, he writes, “the 
very proof that this [the continental drift hypothesis] is right is the harshness of the 
criticism that it generates. And then, what is against it? Absolute facts, fundamental 
impossibilities? No: opposing it is only that its does not fit some other hypotheses, 
accepted today it is true, but what will be their own value tomorrow? […] for if the 
hypothesis is weak, time will carry it gently away …” 
Mascart comments that the authors hold to explanatory reasons that are over-
particular, and concludes the chapters on the geographical causes with the observation 
that “All the successive theories are insufficient.”  
His approach to human causes, today called the anthropogenic effect, is a plea 
for a better management of old documents and archives. He explains how much the 
urban phenomenon changes the characteristics of the weather (temperature, rainfall) 
and that it has to be taken into account to maintain the comparability of measurements. 
He points out that it is the anomalies, the unusual phenomena of the climate, that 
should be put in correspondence with the economic facts, and that in this respect the 
averaging out of data often deletes the most interesting things. The poor quality of the 
measurements in 1925 had him write, “In these circumstances, given the brief duration 
of the few reliable observations, it seems a complete illusion to seek arguments for or 
against the hypothesis of climate variability among meteorological observations 
properly so called”.  
After several chapter devoted to detailing the astronomical causes that are his 
speciality, Mascart devotes a few pages to a discussion of the works relating sunspots 
to the price of wheat or other economic indicators (Herschel 1801, Arago 1825, Barral 
1866, Chambers 1863, Hunter 1876, etc.). Whereas today we are concerned with the 
part played by the economy on the climate, Mascart considers it interesting that some 
causes of climate variation may shed light on economic science, which fits in with his 
permanent concern for scientific fertility.  
The general conclusion of his book deals with the necessity of improving 
observations, the care to be given to measurements and their comparability, 
conservation, and indexation. The net result of his huge work is scarcely inspiring, and 
Mascart knows it. Conscious that his work could be considered confused, he recognizes 
that he hasn’t drawn “the general lines at a stroke, broadly brushing in the steps”, and 
that he still lacks a general point of view. He esteems that faced with “successive 
contradictory works” and “opposed hypotheses”, the “spirit of association and 
collaboration” should be developed further.  
What is outstanding in this book is the constant modesty of the author before the 
complexity of the subject. This attitude leads him to consider as an unyielding reality 
the fact it is impossible to choose among different theories, and that this situation is not 
bad in itself. “[These testimonies] are sometimes contradictory - and this is evidence of 
good faith on the part of the authors”, he writes. (p.33)  Mascart seems to take it for 
granted that scientists are disinterested. Yet knowledge in climate matters may be 
involved in active money-making schemes: this was the case with the plan to immerse 
the Sahara (at that time part of the French empire) by diverting 172 billion of cubic 
meters of water from the Mediterranean with a daily evaporation of 28 million cubic 
meters. Mascart presents the case and discusses both its feasibility and the stakes 
involved. 
As far as climate variability and the question of human influence are concerned, 
the multiplicity of effects and causes is impressive, and the mechanisms which could 
explain them still more so, so that many authors make the mistake of proposing 
theories. “All the authors seem to become intoxicated with the hope of finding simple 
and single origins [of climate variations]” but “each time a cause is considered, it at 
once appears insufficient and is completed by mere hypotheses”. 
  
 
 
1925 Climate map (after E. de Martonne), A. Chevalier and L. Cuenot, Traité de géographie 
physique, Paris, Armand Colin, 1925 
 
The scientists seem to be at a loss faced with this complexity, as if they do not 
want simply to recognise it, or do not know how to examine it as it is, and can do 
nothing other than propose explanatory theories. This is the most common form of 
discourse in scientific publications. The theories are fairly rapidly contradicted by 
certain examples. But Mascart clearly shows that these refutations invalidate the 
numbers and the order of magnitude of the conclusions but not the theories themselves, 
which retain a part of possible truth. This is thus effectively not a situation where the 
Popperian approach is practicable.  
Furthermore, on the specific problem of the anthropogenic effect, we do not 
know what would have happened if human beings had not existed. This remark is 
significant. There is no reason why the path we have not followed should be thought of 
in a more determinist manner than the path we are following. It could certainly have 
been warmer than it is at present: we can imagine, for instance that the oilfields not 
worked by human beings would have spread, naturally or after earthquakes, over the 
surface of the oceans, forming a film which would have obviously changed the 
evaporation and created consequences that are hard to assess 6. 
Reading Mascart’s work, we realize that the epistemologists Popper, Kuhn, and 
Lakatos were mainly thinking of the case of physics, which they raised, consciously or 
not, to the rank of generic situation for scientific knowledge. For in the situation 
described to us, no direction clearly stands out as the rational path. The line adopted by 
our author is a sort of “wait and see”: he places his trust in the scientific community as 
an institution that will abandon weak hypotheses over time and organize itself to make 
use of accessible data7. This attitude has two failings, however: first its passivity, which 
is not the best way of tackling risks, and then the somewhat idyllic image of scientific 
society it relies upon. We shall return to that point later.  
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 In this respect, the imagination of climatologists is also quite productive “what will happen if the slow 
growth of the Bahama strait corals ends up by closing the passage of the Gulf Stream? […] the European and 
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 We should note that such a reference to the scientific community was also made by the contemporary 
pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty as a model for a social organization (R. Rorty "Science as solidarity" in 
The Rhetoric of the human Science, J. S. Nelson, A. Megill and D. N. Mc Closkey eds, Univ. of Wisconsin 
Press 1987). 
The epistemological landscape is here composed of many theories which sometimes 
oppose and sometimes complement one another. Mathematical formalisms are present 
through the astronomical and fluid thermodynamics calculations, and co-exist 
alongside geographical and economic explanations. The result is a vast entanglement 
of causal dynamics. It is noticeable that the first rational steps consisted in simplifying 
so as better to understand. For instance, in the 19th century atmospheric circulations 
were calculated on an ideal sphere without continents or oceans where only physical 
laws applied. But since such models gave a poor explanation of the observations, 
towards the end of the century (Maurice de Tastes 1874), an approach more respectful 
of the observed particularities was tried, and followed from one complexity to another. 
The situation as Mascart felt it can be described epistemologically as a miscellany of 
the points of view of Lakatos, Quine and Feyerabend.  
 It is indeed above all necessary to promote conditions for more cooperative 
research programmes that have a higher concern for accuracy and comparability of data 
(Lakatos). It should also be recognised that chronological series of numbers are always 
finite, and are likely to receive several interpretations, each of which can be improved 
so as to adapt to new data (Quine's underdetermination), Finally, it is unwise to reject 
anything definitively on methodological grounds a priori: it is better to give all ideas a 
chance (Feyerabend). 
 
III. A Generic Situation 
 
The chronological dimension is the principal axis of the problem of climate 
change, and one might imagine that this is why the Popperian doctrine fails to apply. 
Indeed, how can we know today if a theory is falsifiable if its consequences appear 
only in a century or two? Yet we cannot call all predictive theories unscientific, since 
prediction is of the essence of science itself, nor can we accept all theories if they 
contradict one another. 
The chronological dimension pushes the sanctions or possible adjustments into 
the future, but the situation is the same in any field for theories that correctly satisfy 
today’s checks. The deductions furnished by these theories are in advance of 
investigations requiring higher performance equipment and can only be evaluated after 
a better understanding of the field concerned and of its relationship with other domains 
of knowledge. This is evidently not only a question of precision. The refinement of 
instruments goes hand in hand with that of theories, and as mathematics demonstrates 
very well, it is ideas that are the factors of advance in the reading of complexity8. 
Alexandre Koyré has shown that at the time of Tycho Brahe the Copernican system 
was less precise than the Ptolemaic. As for what makes ideas take hold - what gives 
them this enlightening power - it has something to do with simplification but takes the 
most varied forms, as Feyerabend has analysed. To go beyond the available data by 
means of an interpretation which provides more than is strictly to be gleaned by 
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observation: this is what is expected not only of theories in the classical sense, but of 
all models. 
In effect, the epistemological question, “what is true knowledge?”, or what 
makes one set of representations better than another, should be posed today at the level 
of models. The notion of theory that was utilised so extensively by the philosophers of 
the 19th and 20th centuries is now somewhat dated and very academic in hue. Now that 
simple algorithms can engender configurations of astounding variety and 
unexpectedness that defy all theoretical a priori descriptions, we have too many 
artificial examples stemming from no theory9 not to think that natural things are also 
capable of astonishing, specific combinations and dynamics that the search for 
theoretical laws alone cannot reach. 
Let us attempt to analyse the contemporary situation starting from the problem of 
climate change, similar to that analysed by Mascart, but thinking in the context of 
modelling. 
First, it is useful to distinguish between the use of models and the modelling (or 
model creation) that we are considering here. Models can be used in classical scientific 
activity: the satellites of Jupiter discovered by Gallileo were a model of the Copernican 
solar system; the Ehrenfest model helps us understand that the reversibility of the laws 
of mechanics is compatible with the statistical laws of thermodynamics. Modelling is a 
larger and more common activity, consisting in representations, usually but not always 
aided by computer, which are generally intended not so much to offer greater 
objectivity and universality as to help decision and action. 
Modelling presents features which distinguish it from other forms of knowledge 
or representation. 
First of all, it takes place in a precise social setting. It is done by someone (a 
designer, a research laboratory, a design consultancy) for someone, the client (private 
company or public organisation), in an economic and geographical space, at a certain 
date. This obviously does not mean that modelling cannot use tried and tested 
knowledge that is considered as universal and objective, since such knowledge is 
available to all. Rather, it can in addition draw heavily upon data known only to certain 
actors, and its conclusions can make sense only for the action of certain economic 
agents or of certain institutions. 
Next, modelling is a hybrid language, comprising natural language, the language 
of the sciences, and often, the language of the engineering sciences whose several 
special terms fashioned by usage do not achieve perfect rigour (decennial high water 
level, for example). This hybrid language provides semantic input for mathematical 
and computer formalisms and connects them to the signifieds shared by the actors 
concerned. 
Finally, modelling is usually under-determined relative to what it is trying to 
represent. The point made by W. V. Quine that theories can be understood in several 
incompatible ways is much more apparent and general in modelling. This is equally 
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evident in cases where only a finite quantity of observed data is used, as where a finite 
number of points can give rise either to a polynomial or to a linear combination of sine 
and cosine, or where other models are compatible with the data, and different families 
of models are indefinitely perfectible as the number of observations increases. The 
phenomenon is general: an act of modelling can be validated as much as one would 
like, but it remains one interpretation among others. 
The result of these defining characteristics is that the quality of modelling work 
cannot be evaluated without taking into account the person or organisation the work 
was done for, the actor who will make use of it. Let us return to the problem of Jean 
Mascart, who wanted to move things forward, but who was confronted by complex 
phenomena (retroactive effects and symbolic representations) explained by theories 
(today acts of modelling) that were sometimes contradictory, and often imprecise and 
hypothetical. 
 
IV.  Partisan representations are neither unworthy nor dishonest. 
 
Mascart thinks it appropriate to wait. Wait for better observations, and also for 
the scientific community to work in a more cooperative manner by exchanging 
information and criticism so that ad hoc hypotheses are ultimately abandoned. 
 
Today it seems that a growing number of academics recognise that the Popperian 
norm is relevant only in highly idealised cases, and that in practice one is before a 
mixture bringing together among others the views of  Lakatos, Quine, and Feyerabend, 
where the direction of the rationality is  hard to follow. The most scientific attitude 
would thus be to wait before pronouncing upon this or that truth or such and such a 
consequence, while trying to contribute to the research in progress. It must be 
recognised that this “confined” research – “recherche confinée” as Michel Callon10 
calls it - far from the stakes, interests and conflicts of actors, is highly agreeable: ideas 
are favourably received and disciplinary recognition is gratifying. 
 
This attitude may appear wise, but it leads to the permanent victory of faits 
accomplis. As Ulrich Beck pointed out in the 80s, technological innovation emerges 
essentially through faits accomplis, on the one hand via the market release of products 
prepared in secret, and on the other via research laboratories which invent new 
possibilities without controlling who is going to use them11. An epistemology which is 
based on collective knowledge tested within the framework of the world scientific 
community and which leads scientists to wait for progress before pronouncing on 
possible consequences, maintains a passive conformity which protects two pillars of 
contemporary positivism: freedom of initiative for market release of products, and 
freedom for the researcher to work on whatever he sees fit. It is perfectly 
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understandable how faits accomplis such as the spread of GMOs or the delinquent 
feeding of cattle leading to BSE are unstoppable in such a system. This has led to 
reactions such as the precaution principle, wholly understandably in the context. 
 
But we can approach things differently. The narrowly scientific attitude, when 
the wait is over and science has progressed, leads to a situation that is just as confused 
as before. Simply, during this time, a certain number of faits accomplis have emerged, 
accomplished not by angels but by men of every stripe, including drug traffickers, 
unscrupulous egoists, terrorists, and the agencies of totalitarian regimes. And not less 
important are those accomplished anonymously, by everyone and no-one, due to the 
underlying evolution of mores just as the sociologists of modernity have described12. 
The narrowly scientific attitude, which relies upon scientific progress to 
eliminate the least relevant representations, appears to be indissolubly connected to the 
belief that men are good and that groups, nations, organisations, companies, and 
networks are harmless. 
More precisely, this attitude implicitly admits two theses. Firstly, that knowledge 
creation will escape logical contradictions if we work more in a “spirit of co-
operation”, with greater synergy between the modelling teams. In other words, the 
complexity encountered will dissipate if conflicts of interpretation are gradually 
reduced, for example by coming to agreements on experimental protocols which 
become incontestable standards; by eliminating all abstract or vague terms from 
competing theories so that only the strictly descriptive and factual skeleton is retained 
following the ideas of the neo-positivists of the Vienna circle; or by harmonising points 
of view by regular colloquia producing consensual syntheses. This irenism, which 
constantly risks becoming argument by authority, ignores the fact that differing 
interpretations are the principal means at our disposal for advancing in complexity. 
They are our guiding lights in the forest. Their mutual consistency is not a necessary 
condition for comprehension, which can happily accommodate “local maps”, as René 
Thom puts it. In the context of discovery, scientific irenism is an illusion which can 
scarcely win the approval of researchers. 
The second implicit thesis is that the purification necessary for scientific 
detachment is a process that can unfold over time, reality remaining unchanged. This 
was in fact the case from antiquity until, say, the 18th Century: then the influence of 
science on the world through the intermediary of technology was relatively slow, this 
slowness in turn most probably favouring in us the emergence and the durability of 
philosophical categories of division (between the mind and the body, between facts and 
values, between knowledge and interest). But the appropriation of material power or 
the economic advantage that an innovation is likely to give is today extremely rapid. 
This surprises even the research milieu, where knowledge circulates at the rhythm of 
congresses and the reading of publications. The new link with possible social uses has 
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modified the historic significance of laboratory work upstream of innovation13. In 
addition, the intentions of actors (other scientists, developers, etc.), have today become 
a permanent preoccupation, and a possible risk.  
In front of the dangers currently run by our planet and its human and non human 
inhabitants, and projects to manipulate human nature itself14, a more active attitude on 
the part of scientists is indispensable. If he holds to the quest for objectivity, in which 
society tends to maintain him, the scientist will inevitably revert to the narrowly 
scientific attitude. But the moment the lobbies act to promote their strategies, 
academics who thus remain confined in their research (pure or applied) are transformed 
into the mere hired help of a logic of development that is insatiable, blind, and without 
fear. 
We must therefore look to break out of this cycle of pure/applied research – 
development – expansion, which is the credo defended best by economic agents on the 
one hand and by the media on the other. Scientists have certainly a role to play in this 
change, for they bear the vague responsibility for all the absurdities that this motor can 
lead to. They have however only limited means at their disposal: they are ordinary 
citizens, with no financial or institutional power whatsoever. Their only advantage is 
that they know knowledge production well, and one of their most efficient instruments 
is their possession of a language able to deepen both preciseness and interpretations: 
modelling. 
The way that suggests itself consists not only in criticising the results or methods 
of colleagues in order to improve them, but also in criticising the experiments and 
modelling, taking into consideration  the interests these favour, and shouldering the 
imaginative task of reviewing their possible consequences.  
Those who engage in producing counter-models, in partisan cautions in the good 
sense of the term, who contribute to the biodiversity of ideas and representations by 
accepting their own cultural roots, are the true defenders of the collective good as this 
is properly understood. I consider that the most appropriate context for the production 
of these critical models is likely that of the research centre, and that it would be normal 
in this respect for the cultural values of the teams to be present and made explicit, the 
base from which the work of interpretation and anticipation can be conducted. It is in 
“grey literature” that this self-questioning and commitment take place, for the major 
reviews will probably remain politically correct for a considerable time to come. 
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This is the best real work for mankind: expose as much as can be exposed the 
risks that the technological adventure poses for it15. There is a loss to be accepted here: 
the era of knowledge gathering is over. 
With regard to the greenhouse effect, as in other domains, there is no shortage of 
Mr. Homais16 to be found, the sort of person who has had some higher education and 
who will intone to anyone who will listen that “temperature is such a stochastic fractal 
that one can say everything and anything on the subject”. Attempting to make such 
interlocutors understand that the anthropogenic effect has been proved cannot be the 
only aim of scientists. The problem is how to uncover the interests behind the actions 
and the words that hide them, in the very place where the processes occur. Concretely, 
this poses a large number of questions, most evidently that of the right of collective 
scientific authorities to interfere in public and private research. But there is also the 
question of research management, which to me is philosophically fundamental: in 
France we speak a great deal of making universities financially autonomous, while 
implicitly maintaining everywhere the universality of the same positivist classical 
science. Is it not the precise opposite that should be done, namely make the universities 
autonomous in the values they defend, while maintaining public credits for critical 
rationalism as such ? 
 
 
 
The cartoonist Christophe evokes the astronomer Jean Mascart under the pseudonym Jean Scarmat, 
and credits him with special rhetorical powers, L'idée fixe du savant Cosinus, librairie Armand Colin 
1899. 
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